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Quantum data locking is a uniquely quantum phenomenon that allows a relatively short key of constant size
to (un)lock an arbitrarily long message encoded in a quantum state, in such a way that an eavesdropper who
measures the state but does not know the key has essentially no information about the message. The application
of quantum data locking in cryptography would allow one to overcome the limitations of the one-time pad
encryption, which requires the key to have the same length as the message. However, it is known that the strength
of quantum data locking is also its Achilles heel, as the leakage of a few bits of the key or the message may in
principle allow the eavesdropper to unlock a disproportionate amount of information. In this paper we show that
there exist quantum data locking schemes that can be made robust against information leakage by increasing the
length of the key by a proportionate amount. This implies that a constant size key can still lock an arbitrarily
long message as long as a fraction of it remains secret to the eavesdropper. Moreover, we greatly simplify
the structure of the protocol by proving that phase modulation suffices to generate strong locking schemes,
paving the way to optical experimental realizations. Also, we show that successful data locking protocols can
be constructed using random codewords, which very well could be helpful in discovering random codes for data
locking over noisy quantum channels.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum data locking (QDL) is a uniquely quantum pro-
tocol that provides one of the strongest violations of classical
information theory in the quantum setting [1]. In QDL the
knowledge of a relatively short key of constant size allows one
to (un)lock an arbitrarily long message encoded in a quantum
system. Otherwise, without knowledge of the key, only a neg-
ligible amount of information about the message can be ac-
cessed [2–6]. Such an exponential disproportion between the
length of the key and that of the message is impossible in clas-
sical information theory, according to which the bits of secret
key should be at least as many as the bits of encrypted infor-
mation [7]. Although cryptographic applications may seem
natural, it was recognized early that the security provided by
QDL is in general not robust under the leakage of a small frac-
tion of the key or the message. Indeed, as a relatively short
key is sufficient to lock a much longer message, it may very
well happen that the leakage to the eavesdropper of a few bits
is sufficient to unlock a disproportionate amount of informa-
tion. Here we analyze this issue and show that there exist
QDL schemes that can be made resilient against information
leakage at the cost of increasing the length of the secret key
by a proportional amount. We show that to protect QDL from
the leakage of n bits of the key or the message, it is sufficient
to add an overhead of about n bits to the secret key.
The security of QDL is based on the accessible information
criterion. It is well known that such a criterion does not guar-
antee composable security [8]. That is, security is in general
not granted if QDL is used as a subroutine of another proto-
col. To avoid this problem, one should make an assumption
on Eve’s technological capability, and require that the mes-
sage exchanged by QDL is not used for the next protocol until
Eve’s quantum memory expires. For instance, composable
security is granted if the eavesdropper has no quantum mem-
ory and is hence forced to measure her share of the quantum
system as soon as she obtains it. Such additional assump-
tions make the accessible information criterion weaker than
the commonly accepted security criterion for quantum private
communication [8], which is instead related to the Holevo in-
formation. Interestingly enough, a large gap exists between
these two security criteria that may allow for high rate QDL
through quantum channels with poor privacy [9, 10]. As a
matter of fact, explicit examples of channels with low or even
zero privacy that allow for QDL at high rates have been re-
cently provided [11, 12]. It is hence of fundamental interest
to seek a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of QDL,
especially in the presence of noise.
A number of QDL methods exist. In some of the best
known, the codewords are created by applying uniformly dis-
tributed random unitary operations to the vectors of a given
orthonormal basis [2, 3, 5, 6]. The role of the random uni-
taries is to scramble the codewords in such a way that an
eavesdropper has essentially no information about the mes-
sage. The crucial feature of strong QDL schemes is that the
number of scrambling unitaries is much smaller (in fact expo-
nentially smaller) than the number of different messages [13].
Although a scheme that can be implemented efficiently on
a quantum computer exists [5], the realization of QDL with
currently available technologies still presents severe experi-
mental difficulties. Moreover, all known QDL protocols are
defined for a noiseless quantum system. Hence, a problem
of fundamental importance is to design protocols capable of
performing QDL through noisy quantum channels. (Explicit
protocols for QDL through noisy channels have been recently
introduced in [12].)
Here we present two QDL protocols based on random phase
shifts. The first one is based on random vectors (instead of
2random bases) of the form [17]
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉 , (1)
where {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d is a given orthonormal basis in a d-
dimensional Hilbert space, and eiθ(ω) are i.i.d. random phases
with zero mean, E
[
eiθ(ω)
]
= 0. Even the choice eiθ(ω) =
(−1)b(ω) is sufficient, where b(ω) are random binary vari-
ables. We show that codewords sampled from this “phase
ensemble” of vectors suffice to build strong QDL schemes.
It is worth noticing that, compared to previously known QDL
protocols that require the preparation of uniform (Haar dis-
tributed) basis vectors, our scheme greatly simplifies the struc-
ture of codewords for QDL and represents a major simplifica-
tion for optical experimental implementations.
Moreover, the expansion of the set of QDL codewords
given in this paper paves the way to the application of random
coding techniques to lock classical information into noisy
quantum channels [9, 10], which requires the codewords used
to hide information to coincide with the codewords used to
protect information from noise. Codewords randomly se-
lected from an ensemble that attains the coherent information
bound suffice to protect information from noise [20–25]. This
paper shows that such codewords also suffice to keep infor-
mation secure from an eavesdropper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. II we describe a new
QDL protocol where the codewords are obtained by applying
a random phase modulation. Section III provides a sketch of
the proof of the QDL property of our protocol, while details
are provided in the Appendix A. Then, Sec. IV proves the ro-
bustness of QDL to loss of information to the eavesdropper.
Section V discusses possible applications and experimental
realizations of our protocol in quantum optics. Finally, con-
clusions are presented in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING FROM PHASE
MODULATION
In a typical QDL protocol, the legitimate parties, Alice and
Bob, publicly agree on a set of n = MK codewords in a
d-dimensional quantum system. From this set, they then use
a short shared private key of logK bits to select a set of M
codewords that they will use for sending information. If an
eavesdropper Eve does not know the private key, then the
number of bits — as quantified by the accessible information
Iacc, which is defined as the maximum mutual information be-
tween the message and Eve’s measurement result — that she
can obtain about the message by intercepting and measuring
the state sent by Alice is essentially equal to zero for certain
choices of codewords.
We consider here two QDL protocols where Alice and Bob
are able to communicate via a d-dimensional noiseless quan-
tum channel. In the first QDL protocol, to encrypt a message
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, Alice prepares one of the vectors
|ψmk〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
eiθmk(ω)|ω〉 , (2)
where the value of k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is determined by the secret
key, and the vectors are sampled i.i.d. from the phase ensem-
ble defined above.
We require that Bob, knowing the key, is able to decode
with a probability of success close to 1. That is, for any k
there exists a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM)
with elements {Λ(k)m } such that
p¯succ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
Λ(k)m |ψmk〉〈ψmk|
)
≥ 1− ǫ . (3)
On the other hand, we require that if Eve intercepts and
measures the state |ψmk〉, then she will only be able to ac-
cess a negligible amount of information about the messagem,
as quantified by the accessible information Iacc. We require
that [26]
Iacc . δ logM . (4)
Furthermore, for a key-efficient QDL scheme we demand
that K ≪ M . In particular, we require that logK =
O (log logM) and that δ → 0 as K increases.
Here we show that a set of MK codewords randomly se-
lected from the phase ensemble will define a QDL protocol
with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for d large enough. To
show that, we make repeated applications of the following
bound on the largest and smallest eigenvalues of a random
matrix:
Theorem 1 [29] Consider a d × n matrix W , whose entries
are independent and identically distributed random variables
with zero mean, variance σ2, and finite fourth moment. Define
X = (1/n)WW †. Then almost surely as d→∞, the largest
eigenvalue ofX→ (1+√y)2σ2, where y = d/n. In addition,
when d ≤ n, the smallest eigenvalue of X → (1−√y)2σ2.
To apply this theorem to our case, let
W =
n∑
j=1
|ψj〉〈ej | , (5)
where |ψj〉 are n random vectors from the phase ensemble,
and the set {|ej〉} is an orthonormal basis for an auxiliary n-
dimensional Hilbert space. Notice that the elements of W are
just the components of the randomly selected codewords |ψj〉
in the basis {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d. We have
X =
1
n
WW † =
1
n
n∑
j=1
|ψj〉〈ψj | , (6)
and for the phase ensemble σ2 = 1/d.
For finite d, we use another result from random matrix the-
ory:
3Theorem 2 [30] The probability that the largest eigen-
value of X is larger than
[(
1 +
√
y
)2
+ δ
]
σ2 is no
greater than C exp (−dδ3/2/C), where C is a constant.
Similarly, if d < n, the probability that the smallest
eigenvalue is less than
[(
1−√y)2 − δ]σ2 is less than
C/
(
1−√y) exp (−dδ3/2/C).
This theorem states that the probability that the bounds of
Theorem 1 are violated by more than δ vanishes exponentially
with d and δ.
First of all, using these results, we can easily show that for
M ≪ d Bob’s average probability of successful decoding is
p¯succ & 1 − 2
√
M/d. To see that, assume that Bob applies
the “pretty good measurement” POVM with elements
Λ(k)m = Σ
−1/2
k |ψmk〉〈ψmk|Σ−1/2k , (7)
where
Σk =
M∑
m=1
|ψmk〉〈ψmk| . (8)
Then we have, assuming δ ≪ 1,
p¯succ =
1
M
M∑
m=1
∣∣∣〈ψmk|Σ−1/2k |ψmk〉∣∣∣2 (9)
≥ d
M

(1 +
√
d
M
)2
+ δ


−1
(10)
≃ 1− 2
√
M
d
, (11)
where in (10) we have applied Theorems 1 and 2 to bound
Σ
−1/2
k ≥
√
d
M


(
1 +
√
d
M
)2
+ δ


−1/2
. (12)
On the other hand, the bound on Eve’s accessible informa-
tion is given by the following
Theorem 3 SelectMK i.i.d. random codewords |ψmk〉 (m =
1, . . . ,M and k = 1, . . . ,K) from the phase ensemble, with
MK ≫ d and M ≪ d. Then, for any δ > 0 and
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
, (13)
Eve’s accessible information satisfies
Iacc = O (δ log d) (14)
up to a probability
pfail ≤ exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ lnM − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
(15)
that vanishes exponentially in M .
The sketch of the proof is provided in Sec. III, while details
are in Appendix A.
This theorem states that a set of MK random codewords
from the phase ensemble defines a strong QDL protocol. For
instance, if we put δ ≃ 1/ logM , then Iacc is smaller than a
constant with logK = O (log logM). Otherwise, for δ ≪
1/ log d, a secret key of size logK = O (log 1/δ) is sufficient
to guarantee Iacc = O (δ log d).
A. Quantum data locking from random unitaries
The second QDL protocol is defined by a set of random
unitaries of a particular form. We define the “phase ensemble”
of unitaries of the form
U =
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉〈ω| , (16)
where θ(ω) are i.i.d. random phases withE[eiθ(ω)] = 0. Given
the set of Fourier-transformed basis vectors
|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d|ω〉 , (17)
for m = 1, . . . , d, we define a set of dK codewords as
|ψmk〉 = Uk|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d+iθk(ω)|ω〉 . (18)
Notice that for any k, codewords with different m are mu-
tually orthogonal. This implies that Bob can decode with
p¯succ = 1. Furthermore, each codeword in (17) has the same
distribution of the codewords selected from the phase ensem-
ble of vectors. The only difference is that |ψmk〉 and |ψm′k〉
are no longer statistically independent. We thus obtain the
following
Theorem 4 Select K i.i.d. random unitaries Uk (k =
1, . . . ,K) from the phase ensemble and define the codewords
|ψmk〉 = Uk|m〉 (m = 1, . . . , d). Then, for any δ > 0 and
K >
4
δ2
(
ln d+
2
δ
ln
5
δ
)
, (19)
Eve’s accessible information satisfies
Iacc = O (δ log d) (20)
up to a probability that vanishes exponentially in d.
The proof of this theorem can be obtained by a straightforward
modification of that of Theorem 3 and is not reported here.
It is worth noticing that these unitaries form an abelian
group. It is hence somehow surprising that they yield strong
QDL properties.
4III. SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To compute Eve’s accessible information about the mes-
sage, we associate to the sender Alice a dummy M -
dimensional quantum system carrying the classical variable
m as a set of basis vectors {|m〉}m=1,...,M . We then suppose
that Eve intercepts the quantum system that has the encrypted
message. Since Eve does not know the secret key, the corre-
lations between Alice and Eve are described by the following
classical-quantum state:
ρAE =
1
M
M∑
m=1
|m〉〈m|A ⊗ 1
K
K∑
k=1
|ψmk〉〈ψmk|E , (21)
where the codewords |ψmk〉 are as in Eq. (2).
The accessible information is by definition the maximum
classical mutual information that can be achieved by local
measurements on Alice’s and Eve’s subsystems:
Iacc := Iacc(A;E)ρ
= max
MA,ME
H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) , (22)
where MA : A → X , ME : E → Y are local measure-
ments with output variables X and Y respectively, and H( · )
denotes the Shannon entropy of the measurement results.
The optimal measurement on Alice’s subsystem is obvi-
ously a projective measurement on the basis {|m〉}m=1,...,M .
Concerning Eve’s measurement, it is sufficient to consider
only rank-one POVM, which are described by measurement
operators of the form {µj|φj〉〈φj |}j=1...,J , with µj ≥ 0, and
satisfying the normalization condition
∑
j µj |φj〉〈φj | = I. A
straightforward calculation then yields
Iacc = logM−
min
{µj |φj〉〈φj |}
∑
j
µj
M
{
H [Q(φj)]− η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φj)
]}
,
(23)
where η(x) = −x logx, Q(φ) is the M -dimensional real vec-
tor of non-negative components
Qm(φ) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
|〈φ|ψmk〉|2 , (24)
and H [Q(φ)] = −∑Mm=1Qm(φ) logQm(φ) denotes the
Shannon entropy of Q(φ).
We now apply a standard convexity argument, first used
in [1]. To do that, notice that assuming 〈φj |φj〉 = 1, then∑
j µj/d = 1. This implies that the positive quantities µj/d
can be interpreted as probability weights. An upper bound on
the accessible information is then obtained by using the fact
that the average cannot exceed the maximum. We thus obtain
Iacc ≤ logM − d
M
min
|φ〉
{
H [Q(φ)]− η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ)
]}
.
(25)
Notice that now the maximization is no longer over a
POVM with elements {µj|φj〉〈φj |} but over a single normal-
ized vector |φ〉.
Then the proof proceeds along three main conceptual steps:
1. (See Appendix A 1 for details.) Theorems 1 and 2 im-
ply that the random variable
∑M
m=1Qm(φ) is close to
M/d with arbitrarily high probability for all vectors |φ〉
if d is large enough and MK ≫ d. In particular, the
inequality
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ) ≤ M
d


(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ

 (26)
applied to Eq. (25) yields
Iacc ≤ α log d+ η(α) − d
M
min
|φ〉
H [Q(φ)] , (27)
where
α =
(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ . (28)
2. (See Appendix A 2 for details.) We show that for any
given |φ〉 and δ > 0,
η [Qm(φ)] ≥ −1− δ
d
log
(
1− δ
d
)
(29)
for at least (1 − δ)M values of m (up to a probability
exponentially small in M ). To do that, we show that
there is a negligible probability thatQm(φ) < (1−δ)/d
for more than ℓ = δM values of m. This result implies
H [Q(φ)] ≥ M
d
(1− 2δ) log d . (30)
3. (See Appendix A 3 for details.) Finally, to account for
the minimum over all unit vectors |φ〉, we introduce a
discrete set Nδ of vectors with the property that for any
|φ〉 there exists |φi〉 ∈ Nδ such that
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi|‖1 ≤ δ . (31)
A set with this property is called an δ–net. The δ–net
is used to approximate the value of H [Q(φ)] up to an
error of the order of δ log d. We show that the inequal-
ity in (30) holds true with high probability for all unit
vectors in the δ–net.
In conclusion we obtain that for any δ > 0 Eve’s accessible
information satisfies
Iacc = O (δ log d) , (32)
up to a probability which is exponentially small in d provided
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (33)
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We consider our protocols based on the phase ensemble of
random vectors to assess the robustness of QDL against the
leakage to Eve of part of the key or the message.
What happens if part of the key is known by Eve? For ex-
ample, suppose that Eve knows the first γ logK bits of the
secret key. Since the remaining (1 − γ) logK are still secret
and random, it follows that we can still apply Theorem 3 and
Eve’s accessible information satisfies Iacc = O (δ log d) up to
a failure probability
p′fail ≤ exp
[
−M
(
δ3K1−γ
4
− δ lnM − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
. (34)
To assess the security of the QDL protocol under the leak-
age of any fraction of the key, we have to take into account
all the possible subsets of γ logK bits. Each of these subsets,
determines a corresponding subset of K1−γ values of the key
that remain secret to Eve. The number of ways in which these
values can be chosen is
(
K
K1−γ
)
. Applying the union bound
we can hence estimate from (34) the failure probability if any
fraction of γ logK bits leaks to Eve:
p′′fail ≤
(
K
K1−γ
)
p′fail ≤ exp
(
K1−γ lnK
)
p′fail . (35)
Putting M/d = δ, this probability is exponentially small in
M under conditions
K1−γ >
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2
δ2
ln
5
δ
)
(36)
and
M > K1−γ lnK
(
δ3K1−γ
4
− δ lnM − 2
δ
ln
5
δ
)−1
. (37)
In particular, for γ ≪ 1, the condition (36) can be replaced
by
K &
[
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2
δ2
ln
5
δ
)]1+γ
. (38)
Compared to (13), this condition implies that to make QDL ro-
bust against the leakage of a fraction of γ logK bits of the key,
one simply needs to use a longer key of about (1 + γ) logK
bits. This result shows the existence of QDL schemes that are
robust to some loss of key.
What happens if a small fraction of n bits of the message
leaks to Eve? Suppose that Eve knows the first n bits of the
message, then one has to require that the key is sufficiently
long to lock the remaining logM − n bits of the message.
Since the codewords corresponding to the remaining part of
the message are still random, we have
Iacc = O (δ (logM − n)) , (39)
up to a probability
p′fail ≤ exp
{
−M2−n
[
δ3K
4
− δ(lnM − n)
−2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]}
. (40)
We apply again the union bound to estimate the failure proba-
bility if any subset of n bits of the message leaks to Eve:
p′′fail ≤
(
M
M2−n
)
p′fail ≤ exp
(
M2−n lnM
)
p′fail (41)
≤ exp
{
−M2−n
[
δ3K
4
− lnM − δ(lnM − n)
−2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]}
. (42)
For any given n, the latter is exponentially small in M pro-
vided
K >
4
δ3
[
lnM + δ(lnM − n) + 2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]
. (43)
Compared to (13), the last condition implies that to protect
QDL against the leakage of n bits of message, the key should
be enlarged by ∆(logK) ≃ n bits. This result shows the ex-
istence of QDL schemes that are robust to plain-text attack. A
similar result can be obtained starting from other QDL proto-
cols, e.g., using the results of [6, 14] based on the min-entropy
of the message.
V. APPLICATIONS
Towards quantum optical realizations.— The phase ensem-
ble finds natural applications in the context of linear optics.
For instance, codewords belonging to the phase ensemble can
be realized by coherently splitting a photon over d modes
(e.g., spatial, temporal, orbital angular momentum modes,
etc.), then by applying independent random phase shifts to
each mode. If information is encoded in the arrival time, the
codewords can be prepared by first applying a linear disper-
sion transformation (see, e.g., [31]) and then random phase
shifts at different times.
Concerning Bob decoding, in the case of QDL by the phase
ensemble of random unitaries (see Sec. II A) it is sufficient
to apply the inverse transformation of the one applied by Al-
ice for encoding, then measure by photo-detection. Notice
that both encoding and decoding operations can be realized
by linear passive optical elements and photodetection (for de-
coding) as discussed in [9]. For the QDL based on random
codewords from the phase ensemble of vectors, Bob should
in principle decode by applying the pretty good measurement
associated to the set of QDL codewords, yet we don’t know at
the moment an explicit construction.
A crucial requirement to realize our strong QDL protocols
in quantum optics is the ability to prepare and manipulate
quantum states of light in high dimension. The latter is the
goal of cutting edge research and several important milestone
have been achieved so far. See, for example, the recent re-
port of entanglement production between two photons in a
100× 100-dimensional Hilbert space [32].
Quantum data locking of noisy channels.— Although the
phenomenon of QDL has been known for about ten years
now [1], only recently has it been reconsidered in the context
6of noisy quantum channels [9, 10]. In particular, the lock-
ing capacity of a (noisy) quantum channel has been defined
in [10] as the maximum rate at which classical information
can be locked throughN instances of the channel with the as-
sistance of a secret key shared by Alice and Bob which grows
sub-linearly in N . One can indeed define a weak and a strong
notion of locking capacity [10]. In the weak case one assumes
that Eve has access to the channel environment (the output
of the complementary channel), while in the strong case one
gives her access to the quantum system being input to the
noisy channel. Remarkably, there are examples of quantum
channels whose locking capacity is much larger than the pri-
vate capacity [11, 12].
Our result on Eve’s accessible information applies directly
to the strong notion of locking capacity and can be extended
(by a simple application of a data processing inequality) to the
weak case. It hence remains to show how and at which rate
Bob can decode reliably. One way to do that is by concatenat-
ing the QDL protocol with an error correcting code [5, 10, 14].
Consider N ≫ 1 uses of a quantum channel. If the quantum
capacity of the channel is Q, then one can lock information by
choosing codewords in an error correcting subspace of dimen-
sion d ≃ 2NQ. Another approach may consist in designing a
code which allows for both QDL and error correction at the
same time. Our results indicate that random codes exist that
can be applied both for protecting against decoherence and for
locking classical information. (An explicit example has been
recently presented in [12].)
Locking a quantum memory.— The QDL properties of the
phase ensemble can be used to lock information into a quan-
tum memory by applying a local random gauge field. Con-
sider an ideal (noiseless) semiclassical model for a quantum
memory consisting of d charged particles on a ring of length
L. For recording locked information in the quantum mem-
ory, Alice applies a random i.i.d. magnetic field to each par-
ticle and encodes a classical message into one of the momen-
tum eigenstates |p〉 = d−1/2∑dk=1 ei2πpx/L+i ∫ x0 A(x′)dx′ |x〉,
where A(x′) is the vector potential in natural units. Notice
that the application of the random local fields corresponds to
a random phase in the momentum eigenstates. Then, a legiti-
mate receiver who knows the pattern of the magnetic field ap-
plied by Alice, can decode the message by simply measuring
the momentum. On the other hand, Eve’s accessible informa-
tion can be made negligibly small by the QDL effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well known that the security provided by QDL can be
severely hampered if even a small fraction of the key or the
message leaks to Eve. Here we show that, although this is true
in general, there exist QDL protocols that are instead robust
against the leakage of a small part of the message or the key.
Until now, the codewords used in QDL have been restricted
to either Haar-distributed random bases [2, 5, 6] or approxi-
mate mutually unbiased bases [5] (the role of mutually unbi-
ased bases being not yet completely understood [1, 33]). This
paper showed that codewords modulated by random phase
shifts in a given basis suffice to guarantee strong and robust
QDL properties.
The fact that random phases suffice to ensure strong QDL
properties yields a major simplification for the experimen-
tal realization of a QDL protocol. To produce states from
the phase ensemble, one only requires to generate d binary
phase shifts, instead of d2 random variables sampling Haar-
distribution of unitary transformations. The phase ensemble
is well-adapted for use in quantum optical channels, where a
single photon may be coherently split across different modes
(e.g., path or time-bin modes), to which i.i.d. random phase-
shifts are applied. Alternatively, one can employ random uni-
taries from a set of dispersive transformations [31]. To decode
the message, the legitimate receiver can first apply the inverse
transformation of the encoding one (both are linear passive
transformations), then measure by photo-detection [9].
Our results suggest that random codes of the type defined
here can be used to perform direct QDL over noisy quan-
tum channels [9, 10], which requires that the codewords for
QDL (encoding for security) also be appropriate codewords
for combating noise on the channel (encoding for error correc-
tion). A straightforward way for doing that is to concatenate
the QDL protocol with a quantum error correcting code [14],
allowing for a rate of locked communication at least equal to
the quantum capacity of the channel. A fundamental question
is whether one can lock information at a rate higher than the
quantum (and private) capacity. Such a question has indeed
a positive answer, as shown by the results recently presented
in [11, 12], providing examples of quantum channels with low
or zero privacy that instead allow for high rate QDL. In par-
ticular, the phase ensemble was originally proposed in [20]
as a code for attaining the coherent information rate for re-
liable quantum communication over a quantum channel (see
also [23–25]). The results proved here suggest that there exist
random codes defined from the phase ensemble that allow for
robust QDL over a noisy, lossy bosonic channel at a rate equal
to and possibly larger than the coherent information.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3
We now proceed by describing in details the three main
steps of the proof of Theorem 3 sketched in Sec. III.
1. Random matrix theory
We apply Theorems 1 and 2 with n =MK and
W =
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
|ψmk〉〈emk| (A1)
7to obtain that
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ) ≤


(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ

M
d
(A2)
for all unit vectors |φ〉, up to a probability exponentially small
in d and δ.
Since η(x) = −x logx is a monotonically increasing func-
tion near zero and M/d≪ 1, Eq. (A2) yields
d
M
η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ)
]
≤ η


(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ

 (A3)
−


(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ

 log M
d
,
which, applied to (25), implies
Iacc ≤ α log d+ η(α)− d
M
min
|φ〉
H [Q(φ)] , (A4)
where
α =
(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ . (A5)
2. Concentration of the Qm
For any given |φ〉 and δ > 0, we bound the probability that
there exist ℓ = δM ≪ M values of m, say m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ,
such that
η [Qmi(φ)] < −
1− δ
d
log
(
1− δ
d
)
(A6)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. This accounts for bounding the proba-
bility that Qm(φ) takes small values (smaller that (1 − δ)/d)
as well as the probability of large values (larger than 1 −
η[(1 − δ)/d] +O(η[(1 − δ)/d])).
Bounding the probability of large Qm(φ). We first bound
the probability that Qm(φ) takes large values. We apply The-
orems 1 and 2 with n = K and y = d/K . This yields that the
inequality
Qm(φ) ≤
(
1 +
√
d/K
)2
+ δ
d
(A7)
is satisfied for all unit vectors |φ〉, up to a probability exponen-
tially small in d and δ. In particular, for d ≫ K and δ ≪ 1
we obtain
Qm(φ) .
1
K
. (A8)
Bounding the probability of small Qm(φ). To bound the
probability that Qm(φ) takes small values we apply the fol-
lowing theorem:
Theorem 5 [34] Given K i.i.d. positive random variables
Xk ∼ X such that E[X ] and E[X2] are finite, then
Pr
{
E[X ]− 1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk > τ
}
≤ exp
(
− Kτ
2
2E[X2]
)
. (A9)
Let us put
qmk(φ) = |〈φ|ψmk〉|2 = 1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
ω=1
φωe
−iθmk(ω)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (A10)
We have
E[qmk(φ)] =
1
d
∑
ω
|φω |2 = 1
d
, (A11)
and
E[q2mk(φ)] =
1
d2

2∑
ω,ω′
|φω|2|φω′ |2 −
∑
ω
|φω |4

(A12)
=
1
d2
[
2−
∑
ω
|φω |4
]
. (A13)
By noticing that
∑
ω |φω |4 ≥ 1/d, we obtain
E[q2mk(φ)] ≤
1
d2
2d− 1
d
≤ 2
d2
. (A14)
We can thus apply the tail bound in Theorem 5 with Xk =
qmk(φ) and τ = δ/d to obtain
Pr
{
Qm(φ) <
1− δ
d
}
< exp
(
−Kδ
2
4
)
. (A15)
Having bounded the probability of small values of Qm(φ),
we now consider the probability that there exist ℓ values of m
for which Qm(φ) < (1 − δ)/d. Taking into account all the(
M
ℓ
)
choices of ℓ values of m = 1, . . . ,M and applying the
union bound we obtain
Pr
{
∃m1, . . . ,mℓ | ∀ j , Qmj(φ) <
1− δ
d
}
≤
(
M
ℓ
)
exp
(
− ℓKδ
2
4
)
(A16)
≤ exp
(
− ℓKδ
2
4
+ ℓ lnM
)
.
(A17)
3. The δ–net
It remains to prove that (A17) holds true with high probabil-
ity for all unit vectors |φ〉. To show that we follow a standard
strategy and introduce an δ–net of vectors [2]. An δ–netNδ is
a discrete set of |Nδ| vectors such that for any vector |φ〉 there
exists |φi〉 ∈ Nδ such that
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi|‖1 ≤ δ , (A18)
8where ‖X‖1 = Tr|X | is the trace norm.
As discussed in [2], there exist δ–nets in a d-dimensional
Hilbert space with |Nδ| ≤ (5/δ)2d. We can then apply the
union bound to estimate
Pr
{
∃|φi〉 ∈ Nδ,m1, . . . ,mℓ | ∀ j , Qmj(φi) <
1− δ
d
}
≤
(
5
δ
)2d
exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ lnM
)]
(A19)
= exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ lnM − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
.
(A20)
Notice that such a probability is exponentially small inM pro-
vided that
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (A21)
It follows that with probability close to 1
η [Qm(φi)] ≥ 1− δ
d
log d (A22)
for all |φi〉 ∈ Nδ and at least (1 − δ)M values of m. This
result in turn implies
H [Q(φi)] ≥ M
d
(1− δ)2 [log d− log (1− δ)]
≥ M
d
(1− δ)2 log d
≥ M
d
(1− 2δ) log d . (A23)
It remains to estimate the error introduced by the δ–net. The
Fannes-Audenaert [35] inequality yields
|H(Q(φ)) −H(Q(φi))| ≤ ‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1
2
logM
+ h2
[‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1
2
]
,
where ‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1 =
∑
m |Qm(φ) − Qm(φi)| de-
notes the vector trace norm and h2(x) = −x log x − (1 −
x) log (1− x) is the binary entropy. It is shown in Appendix B
that Eq. (A18) implies
‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1 ≤ 2δM
d
, (A24)
up to a probability exponentially small in d and δ.
4. Conclusion
Putting all this together, we obtain that if Eq. (A21) is veri-
fied then
Iacc ≤ (α− 1 + 2δ) log d
+ η(α) + δM/d logM + h2(δM/d) (A25)
≤ (α− 1 + 3δ) log d+ η(α) + h2(δ) , (A26)
up to a probability exponentially small in M . Equation (A21)
implies
K >
1
δ3
d
M
, (A27)
which in turn yields
α− 1 < δ + 2δ3/2 + δ3 . (A28)
In conclusion we have that for any δ and d large enough
there exist QDL protocols defined from the phase ensemble
such that
Iacc = O (δ log d) , (A29)
with a pre-shared secret key of logK bits and
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM +
2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (A30)
Appendix B: Relation between trace norms
To find an explicit relation between the trace norms
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi|‖1 and ‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1, we introduce the
operators
Γm =
d
M

(1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ


−1
1
K
∑
k
|ψmk〉〈ψmk| .
(B1)
Notice that the operators {Γm}m=1,...,M are positive, and
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that
∑
m Γm ≤ I, up to a proba-
bility exponentially small in d and δ. They hence define an
incomplete POVM.
For any unit vector |φ〉, the output of this incomplete
POVM is the subnormalized probability vector Q˜(φ) with en-
tries
Q˜m(φ) = 〈φ|Γm|φ〉 = d
M

(1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ


−1
Qm(φ) .
(B2)
Since an incomplete POVM does not increase the trace dis-
tance, we have that if
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi|‖1 ≤ δ (B3)
then
‖Q˜(φ)− Q˜(φi)‖1 ≤ δ , (B4)
which in turn implies
‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1 ≤ δM
d


(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ

 . (B5)
For sufficiently small δ and d/(MK) this implies
‖Q(φ)−Q(φi)‖1 ≤ 2δM
d
. (B6)
9[1] D. P. DiVincenzo, M. Horodecki, D. W. Leung, J. A. Smolin,
B. M. Terhal, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 067902 (2004).
[2] P. Hayden, D. Leung, P. W. Shor, A. Winter, Commun. Math.
Phys. 250, 371 (2004).
[3] H. Buhrman, M. Christandl, P. Hayden, H.-K. Lo, S. Wehner,
Phys. Rev. A 78, 022316 (2008).
[4] D. Leung, International Workshop on Statistical-Mechanical
Informatics 2008 (IW-SMI 2008), J. Phys.: Conference Series
143, 012008 (2009).
[5] O. Fawzi, P. Hayden, P. Sen, Journal of the ACM 60, 44 (2013).
[6] F. Dupuis, J. Florjanczyk, P. Hayden, D. Leung, Proc. Royal
Soc. London, Ser. A 469, 20130289 (2013).
[7] C. Shannon, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28, 656 (1949).
[8] R. Ko¨nig, R. Renner, A. Bariska, U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett.
98, 140502 (2007).
[9] S. Lloyd, ‘Quantum enigma machines,’ arXiv:1307.0380
(2013).
[10] S. Guha, P. Hayden, H. Krovi, S. Lloyd, C. Lupo, J. H. Shapiro,
M. Takeoka, M. M. Wilde, Phys. Rev. X 4 011016 (2014).
[11] A. Winter, ‘Weak locking capacity of quantum channels can be
much larger than private capacity,’ arXiv:1403.6361 (2014).
[12] C. Lupo and S. Lloyd, ‘Locked communication and key gener-
ation at (almost) the classical capacity rate,’ arXiv:1406.4418
(2014).
[13] As noticed in [5, 14], unitary designs [15] are not suitable for
defining strong QDL schemes. In particular, they don’t allow
in general for a secret key of constant size. We think the same
holds true for local random circuits [16].
[14] O. Fawzi, ‘Uncertainty relations for multiple measurements
with applications,’ PhD thesis, McGill University (2012),
arXiv:1208.5918.
[15] C. Dankert, R. Cleve, J. Emerson and E. Livine, Phys. Rev. A
80, 012304 (2009).
[16] F. G. S. L. Brandao, A. W. Harrow and M. Horodecki, ‘Local
random quantum circuits are approximate polynomial-designs’,
arXiv:1208.0692 (2012).
[17] Random coding is a standard technique to cope with noisy in-
formation transmission. QDL represents no exception, as well
as other protocols related to QDL where coding techniques have
been already applied, e.g., quantum hiding fingerprint [18] and
the bounded-quantum-storage model for quantum key distribu-
tion [19]. In particular, codewords of the form (1) were also
considered in [18] in the context of quantum hiding fingerprints.
[18] D. Gavinsky, T. Ito, Quantum Inf. & Comput. 13, 583 (2013).
[19] I. Damgaard, S. Fehr, L. Salvail, C. Schaffner, arXiv:0708.2557
(2012); CRYPTO 2007, LNCS 4622, pages 342-359.
[20] S. Lloyd, Phys. Rev. A 55, 1613 (1997).
[21] P. W. Shor, ‘The quantum channel capacity and coherent infor-
mation,’ in Lecture Notes, MSRI Workshop on Quantum Com-
putation, 2002 (unpublished)
[22] I. Devetak, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 51, 44 (2005).
[23] P. Hayden, P. W. Shor, A. Winter, Open Syst. Inf. Dyn. 15, 71
(2008).
[24] M. Horodecki, S. Lloyd, A. Winter, Open Sys. Info. Dyn. 15,
47 (2008).
[25] R. Klesse, Open Sys. Info. Dyn. 15, 21 (2008).
[26] An alternative criterion for QDL is obtained in terms of the total
variational distance. Suppose that Eve applies a measurement
with outcomes labeled by the index l. Then, for any of the mes-
sages m one has a conditional probability p(l|m) for obtaining
measurement outcome l when message m is transmitted. The
total variational distance criterion for QDL requires
D =
∑
l,m
|p(l|m)p(m)− p(l)p(m)| (B7)
to be small for all measurements of Eve, where p(m) is
the probability of transmitting message m and p(l) =∑
m
p(l|m)p(m). The interpretation here is that if (B7) is
small, then Eve cannot do much better than random guess-
ing to determine the message. As discussed in [5], a straight-
forward application of the Alicki-Fannes inequality [27] im-
plies that if D ≤ δ/2, then Iacc ≤ 4δ log d + 2h2(δ), where
h2(δ) = −δ log δ−(1−δ) log (1− δ) is the binary entropy. On
the other hand, the Pinsker inequality implies that (see e.g., [28]
and references therein)
D ≤
√
(2 ln 2)Iacc . (B8)
That is, if Iacc ≤ δ log d then D ≤
√
2δ ln d.
[27] R. Alicki, M. Fannes, J. Phys. A 37, L55 (2004).
[28] A. A. Fedotov, P. Harremoe¨s, F. Topsøe, IEEE Trans. Inf. The-
ory 49, 1491 (2003).
[29] Z. D. Bai, Y. Q. Yin, Annals of Probability 21, 1275 (1993).
[30] O. Feldheim, S. Sodin, Geom. Funct. Anal. 20, 88 (2010).
[31] J. Mower, Z. Zhang, P. Desjardins, C. Lee, J. H. Shapiro, D.
Englund, Phys. Rev. A 87, 062322 (2013).
[32] M. Krenn, M. Huber, R.Fickler, R. Lapkiewicz, S.
Ramelow, A. Zeilinger, ‘Generation and confirmation of a
(100 × 100)-dimensional entangled quantum system,’ PNAS,
doi:10.1073/pnas.1402365111 (2014).
[33] M. A. Ballester, S. Wehner, Phys. Rev. A 75, 022319 (2007).
[34] A. Maurer, J. Inequal. Pure Appl. Math, 4, 15 (2003).
[35] M. Fannes, Commun. Math. Phys. 31, 291 (1973); K. M. R.
Audenaert, J. Phys. A 40, 8127 (2007).
